The Ninth and Tenth

OF THE

Controverſial LETTERS,

OR

Grand Controverſie,

Concerning

The pretended Temporal Authority of *POPES* over the whole Earth,

And the

True Sovereign of *KINGS* within their own reſpective Kingdoms.

Between two Engliſh Gentlemen,

The one of the Church of England:
The other of the Church of Rome.

LONDON,

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FRIEND,

I Expect that which you ſay remains with much impatience, and tis only to tell you ſo, that I now write; for I do not intend to give you my thoughts of your laſt, till I receive your next. Only let me tell you it wambles in my ſtomack I know not how, and works not kindly: but becauſe your next poſſibly may fully ſettle me, I will not yet complain. But methinks this next opportunity of yours is long a coming. Have you been ſick? or diverted with buſineſs of greater conſequence then clearing your ſelf, and your Church from an aſperſion, of which I take no joy to tell you, the ſuſpicions are more pregnant than I wiſh they were. For 'tis undeniable that Tenets inconſiſtent with Government are maintained among you. You ſay they belong not to Religion; and that indeed is ſomething, but not enough. This may ſerve in ſome meaſure to juſtify your Religion; but nothing at all to clear your ſelves: For what matter is it whether your Religion be innocent, if all that profeſs it are guilty, though upon another account. If you think theſe Tenets true, you will be apt to practiſe them at one time or other, although they do not belong to Religion. Religion indeed is the ſtrongeſt Principle of action, but not the only one. It is no part of Religion that two and three make five; but yet if you do think to pay a debt of five pounds, with twice forty ſhillings, no body will deal with you. And if all the Papiſts in *England* adhere to theſe Doctrines, whether this adheſion of theirs proceed from Religion, or any other motion, the men will be unſafe and irreconcileable to the ſecurity of their Country, let the Religion be what it will. But if there be any who think them falſe, it were convenient both for the ſatis-

faction of their Prince and Fellow subjects, and the intereſt of the thinkers. People ſhould know who thoſe *any* are. We cannot know your thoughts unleſs you acquaint us with them. And becauſe we have reaſon to believe, that ſome do hold them, aud no reaſon to believe of any particular man; but he is of the number till he diſclaim them, what can we do but involve you all, guilty and innocent, if there be any ſuch, in the ſame condemnation of diffidence.

You tell me the *French* plainly and openly condemn them: The honeſter men they; and the more ſhame for ſome body that there ſhould be more honeſty found in *France* then *England*. You ſhould do as they do though t'were but to be in the mode. In all their airy toys, their Feathers, their Perukes, their Pantaloons you can follow them faſt enough. But when they play the men, and ſet you examples of praiſ-worthy actions, there you are content to be out of faſhion; as if it were an honor to be as light as they, and a ſhame to be as wiſe. But pray what ſecurity is it to *England*, that they are good ſubjects in *France*? If they were knaves all over the reſt of the world, and we all honeſt at home, it were a great deal better for us than that they ſhould be honeſt abroad, and we knaves at home. I perceive indeed by what they do, that you tell me true when you ſay theſe Tenets are no points of your Faith: But then methinks you ſhould have the leſs difficulty to diſclaim them. Unleſs perhaps you think them true; which if you do, either make them out to be conſiſtent with goverment, or you will not be conſiſtent your ſelf. I tell you plainly I ſhall think ill of you, if you think well of theſe Doctr nes, unleſs you can ſhew them innocent and ſafe: which as far as I perceive you do not go about to do, and when you offer at it, may, I believe, with as much hope of ſucceſs offer at the Philoſophers ſtone.

In other Countrys you tell me; They are more reſerved, and will not ſay *you can not*, but *you ſhall not*. And I believe you have liv'd in thoſe other Countrys, and ſuck't their

their Polities with their Air. But for my part I muſt confeſs I am for the mode once in my life, and would be of the *French* faſhion in this particular. 'Tis true as long as there is good intelligence betwixt Prince and ſubject, and the Peoples affections carry them to their Soveraigns intereſts, this *ſhall not* may do pretty well. For no effect can follow from a Power which is hindred to work, and 'twill be alwayes eaſy enough to find a pretence for not doing what we are before hand reſolved ſhall not be done. Neither did I ever think the *Pope*'s Power ſo ſtong, that it was likely to prevail where Prince and People both joyn againſt it So that in this caſe your *Can not* and your *Shall not* are two lines which meet both in the ſame center, *no depoſition*. But what becomes of a King, if his ſubjects be not affected as they ſhould? A mule is not more homerous than the Multitude, nor can boggle more extravagantly, and upon leſs occaſion. And though they be well diſpoſed, are ſubject to be wrought upon by the artifice of thoſe who are not, and eaſily poſſeſt with a thouſand jealouſies and fears, from which even thoſe who poſſeſs them perhaps are free enough themſelves. If upon any capricious toy of their own, or crafty ſuggeſtion from abroad they come to wiſh the Princeleſs Power then he has, and that he ſtood in awe of ſome body, 'twill be the eaſieſt thing in the World to perſwade them that what they deſire ſhould be true, is ſo, and that he is ſubiected to the *Pope*, whoſe claim is as fair as any, if they would have him ſubject at all. And where's your *Shall not* then? I fear he will go near to repent the modeſty of his Polities, and find too late that by delaying to fix the *Pope's Can not* in the minds of his ſubjects, he his brought a worſe *Cannot* upon himſelf, a *Can not* avoy'd being turn'd out of his Throne. If in ſuch a poſture of things he would but go about to perſwade the People of the *Pope*'s *Can not* on all likelyhood t'would incenſe them more, and make them think it yet more juſt he ſhould be deprived of his own right, who would invade the right of another For if it be not truly the *Pope*'s right, why did he ſuffer it to paſs

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uncontroul'd ſo long, and now begin to queſtion it when it makes againſt him? But let them do what they will in other Countries, and follow ſuch Maxims as they conceive fitteſt for them. Plain dealing ſuits beſt with the *Engliſh* Natures, and will I believe prove the beſt Policy. If they think good elſewhere to let their ſecurity depend on tricks, much good may their Policies do them: I ſhould be ſorry it ſhould be taken for good Policy here. However I recommend plain dealing to you; for why ſhould you go beating about the buſh when your mark is fair before you? But I forbear to preſs you now; If your next pleaſe me not you are like to hear more. I have nothing to do at preſent but to intreat you would diſpatch it away by the firſt, and to aſſure you I am

Yours, &c.

FRIEND,

I Have been neither buſy nor ſick, but only of the lazy diſeaſe, Idleneſs; which is ſickneſs and buſineſs both, or as bad; and ſhould perhaps do better to continue idle ſtill, then be longer buſy with this ſubject. Your ſilence made me hope my laſt might have ſerv'd turn, and excus'd me from dealing farther in an argument to which I have no fancy. But it ſeems you are not ſatisfi'd. When I know what 'tis you ſtumble at, I will do the beſt I can to keep you upright. But when you talk of plain dealing, I know not what you would have. To acquaint you plainly with what People ſay, is plain dealing in my judgment; One can hardly dogmatize without ſome ſubtilty, but the *Hiſtorian* is a plain man. I hope you have no juſt cauſe of exception againſt my relation hitherto, and I ſhall endeavor to give you as little in the progreſs, which ſince you ſo much de-

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ſire to know, take it without more ado; and take this conſideration along with you, that we are now come to the *Triarii*. The Arguments which made up my laſt Letter were ſuch as occur'd to *Bellarmin* when he had no oppoſition to help his fancy, and expected none, at leaſt from thoſe of his own communion. Afterwards *Barclay* in *Franee* and *Withrington* in *England* write both againſt him. And as oppoſition is the beſt whetſtone of wit, the ſight of what can be ſaid againſt us on the one ſide enlarging wonderfully our proſpect of things, and repreſenting them in a clearer view, and on the other, the ſhame of being worſted, and pleaſure of victory ſtreining our abilities, and preſſing from them all they will afford. We cannot but look upon theſe later productions of his as the uttermoſt he was able to do. For certainly, he omitted nothing which he thought could be ſaid in his defence. You will therefore obſerve theſe Arguments with more attention, while I relate them with the ſame fidelity. They are principally four, all in his Book againſt *Barclay*. *Schalkenins* has the very ſame, ſometimes a little differently worded, ſometimes not all. So that I perceive they are what they finally bide upon.

The firſt is this. *That it is certain and manifeſt that the* Pope *upon juſt cauſe may judg of temporals, and ſometimes depoſe temporal Princes, we prove firſt from the common conſent o Writers whoſe words I have related at the beginning of this diſputation* (where he had alledged no fewer than 70) *For what Doctors teach with a common conſent in different times and places, that the Univerſal Church is believed to hold and teach. For God therefore placed Paſtors and Doctors in the Church.* Eph. 4. *that the people ſhould follow them as their guides, and not reeede from them, unleſs perhaps they ſee ſome one bring in ſome novelty againſt the common doctrine, as* Barclay *at this time has done.* This is the firſt Argument which ſpeaks big, and makes a magnificent ſhew, engaging no leſs than the Univerſal Church it ſelf. But ſure *Bellarmin* either forgot himſelf, or thought his Readers would, when he objects novelty to *Barclay*. Novelty was the very thing objected againſt his

opinion

opinion when it first broke out in the world, in the time of *Gregory* VII.

This Novelty (not to call it heresy) was not yet crept into the World, &c. says one. *That (* the independency of the two supream Powers*) was the true opinion of all the antients, and if doubts be newly started by a sinister desire of pleasing in many, let the old be recalled* says another. And does he now pretend antiquity? He who of all the men in the World, a body would think, has the least reason, when the most ancient Author himself can alledg in prof of this old doctrine of his, is *Greg.* VII. the man who began this bustle, and was charged with novelty for doing so, and after all liv'd but in the 11*th.* age. Since Christ's time what is once new in the Church is alwaies new. For 'tis not with doctrines as with fashions. A new doctrine can never grow old, nor an old doctrine new. To fix antiquity on what was not heard of in the Church for ten ages, is with the confidentest, and he must trust much to his Rhetorick, who goes about to perswade it. In the mean time *John Barclay*, in defence of his Father, has reason to say that this leaving the common consent is not to be objected to him; but to those who spring up in later ages, teach against the torrent of the Ancient Church.

Vin. Bell.

Cusan.

But to his Argument. Of the 70 Authors which he produces out of *Italy*, *France*, *Spain*, *Germany* and *Britain*, and all since *Greg.* 7. with whom he begins, a great part are *Canonists*, many such Divines who go their way, and only use their Arguments; some are not for him, and others plainly against him. At least *John Barclay* says so, who examines them all particularly. For my part I intend not to take so much pains. To read threescore and ten depositions and sift them one by one, is beyond my patience. A man would sooner loose an ordinary cause then carry it at the expence of so much toyl. But if I mistake not, satisfaction may be had at a cheaper rate. The Topick is Autority, and that to my apprehension is efficacious but in two cases. One, when the point in question is beyond

yond the reach of reaſon, as in Myſteries of Faith, which becauſe the ſhortneſs of human underſtanding cannot comprehend, there is no means for men to lay hold of but by relying on ſuch an underſtanding as can and does. Thus Religion is believ'd, becauſe much of it cannot be ſeen, and our ſecurity is the Authority of our firſt Teacher God and Man, who we are ſure ſaw himſelf what we could not, and brought good evidence that he did ſo. And ſo upon the matter we ſee with his eyes what we cannot with our own. The other caſe which requires Authority is from a contrary ground, not from the abſtruſeneſs of the points propos'd, but weakneſs of the underſtanding to which they are propoſed. As when I preſs ſomething upon another, whereof I could bring proof good enough, but his dulneſs cannot take it. Here again Authority is all the Argument which can be uſed. If I have not credit enough to perſwade him to believe me, there is nothing to be done. You may ſay, if you will, there is the ſame reaſon in both caſes, *viz.* Weakneſs of Underſtanding; only in the firſt, the weakneſs is general, and extends to all mankind; in the ſecond particular, and belongs but to ſome. But which ſoever you ſay, I do not remember that Authority is otherwiſe concluſive. Wherefore this point of the *Pope*'s Power muſt either be of a Nature too ſublime for any underſtanding to reach, or it cannot be preſt by Authority but only upon the weak and dull. I know not which of the two *Bellarmin* fancied, when he choſe this Argument, but in my opinion they are wild fancies both. If he thought it ſo ſublime, how came he by it himſelf? And to what purpoſe does he bring ſo many reaſons to prove what is above reaſon, and not attainable by it? There is no way to climb to ſuch a height but by immediate ſteps of one to another, whereof the firſt had it with the reſt of the Myſteries of Religion, from Chriſt himſelf. But as this way is neither endeavoured nor pretended, ſo it would place the point in the ſame degree of obligation, with the belief of the Trinity, Incarnation, and the reſt; which, to omit the known untruth and what

elſe might be ſaid, would leave no excuſe for communicating with thoſe who openly diſavow it. Then to think all men weak and dull, and none able to look upon the dazling luſtre of thoſe reaſons by which the point may be prov'd, and upon that account deſcend to Authority, is as much on the bow hand on the other ſide, and a fancy which ſeems hardly credible in ſo modeſt a man as *Bellarmin* was. And yet one of the two muſt be ſayd, or I know not what place there is for Authority. Of a thing which can it ſelf be ſeen, and to thoſe who can ſee it, it ſeems to as little purpoſe to talk what others ſay of it, as if, to perſwade men that this ribond is green, and the other blew, I ſhould ſpend time in numbring how many thought ſo, when 'tis but ſhewing the ribonds and every body can tell what their color is.

To my apprehenſion therefore the whole Topic ſeems improper and ill choſen. Notwithſtanding let us ſee what it will do. And in the firſt place methinks it were convenient to take along with us what Authority means, and how they ought be qualified who can pretend to it. And becauſe I intend not to make a common place of it, and ſwell my Letter by delating farther then is neceſſary, I ſhall mention but one qualification; but ſuch an one as in my opinion is very requiſite, *viz.* That thoſe by whoſe authority others are to be perſwaded, do themſelves know that to which others are to be perſwaded. For I obſerve the world is a little reſty and unwilling to be led by thoſe whom they account weak and ſhallow. And then this Authority is an Argument, which does not render the truth apparent to the eyes of thoſe who accept it upon Authority, but ſuppoſe it ſeen by Authority, and in vertue of that ſight to be believed by other folks. But if it be not ſeen by thoſe whoſe Authority is preſt upon me, I can not imagine what title they can pretend to Authority, nor in vertue of what I can be preſt to follow it. For certainly if I be blind my ſelf it is very unreaſonable I ſhould take for a guide one who is as blind as I am. When one blind man leads another, we know what becomes of both.

Now

Now becauſe a concluſion is not ſeen till it be rightly prov'd, among thoſe ſeventy men of Authority whom *Bellarmin* alleadges, there muſt be ſome one or more, who has ſeverely prov'd the point in queſtion, or neither he nor any man elſe can ſay that any of them ſaw it. If there be no full proof among them all, there can be no Authority, nor reaſon why others ſhould take them for Guides, who for any thing we know are themſelves blind, as well as thoſe whom they would lead. If there be, ſhew the ribond without more ado, and never amuſe us with what other people ſay of the colour. It is a much ſhorter and much eaſier way for him to produce, and us to ſee one good proof, then to ſtand ſifting the depoſitions of 70 men whereof 69 perhaps ſpeak little to the purpoſe. And after all too, this proof muſt needs appear at laſt; for till it do, as I come from ſaying, there is no reaſon we ſhould believe thoſe who, for ought appears, know no more than we who are required to believe them.

But to make this matter as plain as I can, what is the reaſon, when a man affirms a thing without proof, there is ſo little obligation, that on the contrary tis lightneſs to believe him? I ſuppoſe, becauſe bringing no proof (and by no proof I mean no ſufficient proof) he may for ought appears be miſtaken, and we with him. Why then inſtead of one put twenty that ſay it, or if you will a hundred, or as many as Arithmetick can number; and put them to bring no more proof then the ſingle man, in what is their caſe different from his, or how am I excus'd from lightneſs or ſecur'd from error if I believe them? Wherefore, either produce the man who brings ſufficient proof, and let us ſee that ſufficient proof of his, and let alone the 69 Cyphers which ſtand before him; or if none can be produced, 'tis a clear caſe they are altogether ſo many inſufficient proofs, and to think that number is ſufficient, when every particular is inſufficient, is to think that a great many nothings will make ſomething.

And this is the caſe of *Bellarmin*'s Authority, which yet has ſomething particular in it. Of his 70 Witneſſes

half are either Canoniſts, or ſuch who profeſſing other ſtudies, rely in this point on the Arguments of the Canoniſts. Theſe Arguments *Bellarmin* himſelf thinks faulty, and has taken ſucceſsful pains to confute. Now would I fain know what great neceſſity there is of believing thoſe, who I know before hand have themſelves no reaſon to believe what they tell me? To offer me theſe, is plainly to offer me error for ſecurity againſt error, and to make me believe that I ſhall not be deceiv'd if I follow thoſe who are, and that the way to go right is to go after thoſe who ſtray. I know *Bellarmin* thinks them right in the main though they miſtake in a circumſtance; for example, that they think well of the power, though they are out in thinking it *Direct*. But if they miſs and miſtake all in the circumſtance, how can I know but they do ſo in the main? 'Tis plain they all miſtake when they ſay 'tis *direct*; therefore their conſent in ſaying a thing, does not make that thing to be true; wherefore neither can the other, in which he thinks they ſay true, be therefore true; becauſe they ſay it, and this even in *Bellarmin*'s Judgment. And that he ſhould preſs that on another which he does not value himſelf, ſeems a little unreaſonable. Then for the other half who go upon other grounds then the Canoniſts, I will take the liberty to ſuppoſe they go upon the ſame with *Bellarmin*, or worſe. For he was too judicious a man, to back good arguments, and chooſe bad in their rooms. Now what his are, (beſides what you will find here) you know by my laſt. If any man think them good, he may for me. But this is clear, that no number of men perſwaded by theſe arguments can add more ſtrength to the concluſion then thoſe arguments give it. And ſo we are juſt where we were. If the Arguments be ſufficient to prove the concluſion, the buſineſs is done, and Authority ſuperfluous; if they be not, what he calls Authority is but a number of inſufficient proofs, or of men led by them, which inſufficiently proofs I am deſired to take for ſufficient proof. And this in plain *Engliſh* is to deſire me, becauſe thoſe who are deceived are a great many,

many, to believe they are not deceived; as if by adding black to black and laying on black enough the wall would become white. I know that number generally carries with it a fair perſwalion (eſpecially where the men are otherwiſe conſiderable) that they are not all miſtaken. But of the one half of theſe, *Bellarmin* aſſures us they actually are miſtaken, notwithſtanding their number; and whoever does not approve *Bellarmin*'s Arguments can not but think as much of the other half. Wherefore it muſt of neceſſity reſt upon proof at laſt, and this Topic of Authority might, in my opinion, have very well been ſpared. For if any can ſee the concluſion prov'd, he needs no Authority, but is oblig'd in vertue of that ſight to ſtand to what he ſees, though there were none in the world of the ſame judgment with him. But to thoſe who cannot, this Authority is a bare ſaying without proof, that is no Authority.

However *Bellarmin* tryes to make it up, and intitle the Church it ſelf to the ſayings of his 70 men. *What Doctors teach*, ſayes he, *with a common conſent in different times and places, that the univerſal Church is believed to hold and teach. For God therefore placed Paſtors and Doctors in the Church.* Eph. 4. *that the People ſhould follow them as their Guides*, &c. I think, to make this Argument look any thing like, to his *common* he ſhould have added *univerſal* conſent. For if Doctors teach differently, many one way, and many the quite contrary, I hope the Church ought not to be believed to hold and teach what both teach; or if ſhe do, ſhe muſt plainly be believed to hold and teach contradictories. Now for *Bellarmin*'s 70 *Canon* hath alledged more then twice 70 on the other ſide. How then is it poſſible to find the Churches doctrine by the conſent of her Doctors, when they are ſo far from common conſent that they teach direct contraries? Again, to univerſality of conſent there goes univerſality both of time and place. *Bellarmin* either thought of no more, or could produce no more than out of the Weſtern Church. I hope he does not think the Church confin'd to the Weſt. In all

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controverſies of Faith, others and he himſelf uſes to produce teſtimonies from other places. We hear of S. *Cyprian*, and S. *Auſtin*, S. *Baſil*, S. *Cyril*, S. *Jo. Chryſoſtom*, *Origin*, *Tertullian*, &c. whereof none belong to the Weſt. Can that conſent be univerſal to which there concur none of theſe once ſo famous parts of the Church? Then for time he begins with *Greg.* 7. and he liv'd but in the 11*th.* age. Are 10 whole ages ſo inconſiderable, that they make nothing to univerſal conſent? Theſe links can never hang well together that have ſuch a gap in them, nor is it poſſible to be believed the Church ſhould univerſally teach what none of all her Doctors in ten ages mentioned. Alaſs! how little ſubſtance there is in theſe great words *common conſent* and *the Church*: But *God therefore placed Paſtors and Doctors that People ſhould follow them*, very true. But when God placed thoſe Paſtors and Doctors, he put into their mouths the Doctrine which they ſhould preach and teach. So far as they deliver that doctrine, they have his Authority for their warrant, but no further. If they will teach any other truth, they may without doubt, provided they can make it appear to be Truth; in which caſe the evidence by which they can make it appear is their warrant, not the Authority of God; and provided farther that what they teach in this manner be neither preſt by them, or accepted by others as part of the Doctrine which they are commiſſionated by Chriſt to teach, but as found out by their own or other mens whether induſtry or luck. For theſe Paſtors and Doctors ceaſe not to be men by becoming Paſtors and Doctors, and men cannot be hindred from doing like men, and uſing their reaſon, and diſcourſing as well as others, and now and then as ill. In which caſes, though the material men be Paſtors and Doctors, yet now they act not as Paſtors and Doctors, but barely as men. Daily converſation furniſhes us with a hundred examples of the like nature. A Judg for example is a Judg as long as his Commiſſion laſts; but how few of the mans actions belong to the Judg? He governs his Children as a Father, his Servants as a Maſter, he diſcourſes

diſcourſes as a Scholar, he eats and drinks and ſleeps as a meer man. 'Tis the Judg who does all theſe things. But certainly if he have a bad palate, for example, and chuſe unwholeſom food for ſophiſticated wine, none will think he makes that choice in vertue of his Commiſſion, or that the Prince or State are concern'd in the errors of his Palate. So 'tis with Paſtors and Doctors. In what they act by vertue of the Commiſſion given them by Chriſt, ſo far they are Paſtors and Doctors, in other things meer men; which men are indeed Paſtors and Doctors; but extend not that Authority to things not included in their Commiſſion. When they tell us this Doctrine we have receiv'd from our Predeceſſors, and they from Chriſt, and tell us this with an univerſality of conſent both for time and place, we muſt hear and obey Chriſt in them whoſe commiſſion they execute. But when they diſcourſe, lay down their aſſertions, and bring their proofs, by *Bellarmin*'s favor, we have no more obligation to be led by them then the ſtrength of their proof layes upon us. For now they are no more Paſtors and Doctors, then the Judg is a Judg when he tells a ſtory, or delivers his opinion in a point of Law by way of diſcourſe, and without giving ſentence. For my part, I conceive the Church ſo far from being engaged by the opinion of 70 men, though they be all Paſtors and Doctors, that I believe it very poſſible, that all the material Paſtors and all the Doctors in the Church, and all the Sheep and Scholars too, may be perſwaded of a thing which the Church taken as a Church, neither believes, nor has any thing to do with. And I think that ſuch a caſe not only poſſibly may be, but actually has happened; as in the belief of the *Antipodes*, the *motion of the earth*, and perhaps twenty ſuch things even at this preſent. The truth is, if any one ſhould put me to it, I do not well know how to prove it. But let us for once ſuppoſe, there was a time when there was no man in the Church more knowing than S. *Auſtin*, and that the conſent againſt the *Antipodes* was ſo common and univerſal, that there was not ſo much as any one who held otherwiſe. I conceive it would

would be a very falſe inference, if any ſhould from thence conclude that the Church at that time held there were no *Antipodes*. For 'tis a plain caſe that *Church* imports *Faith*, and *Faith* a derivation from Chriſt; and ſince 'tis known that he taught nothing of the *Antipodes*, 'tis clear that no opinion concerning them can belong to Faith, or the Church. Whoever they be who hold for or againſt them, or however they may belong to the Church in other reſpects, in this particular ſhe has nothing to do with him, nor they with her. For now they act not as believers, but as Schollars, and 'tis only as believers that they belong to the Church, for the Chuch is a Congregation of faithful. Tis true theſe believers are many of them Schollars too, but when they play the Scholars have no priviledg, nor ſecurity againſt error from Chriſt or the Church, but muſt look to their diſcourſes, and ſtick to their Learning; in which if they fail, as they very well may and often do, 'tis at their own perils, for the Church is no farther engaged than in what they take from her, and ſhe warrants to be received from Chriſt. But this point is already diſcourſt at large in my firſt letter, and the little I have ſaid here peradventure is more then needs. For this Authority, which *Bellarmin* would pin upon the Church, is no more then the ſayings of ſo many men, whereof one half he recites and diſproves himſelf, the other half depend upon the ſtrength of their Arguments, which are the only means by which other men can judg whether they deſerve more credit then their fellows, and when all is done are contradicted by twice as many as learned and as famous. And this I ſhould think ſo far from the Authority of the Church, that 'tis well if it be any Authority at all. And ſo much for the firſt Argument.

The ſecond is this. *We prove it ſecondly by the Extrav. Unam ſanctam de Major. & Obed. Where we are taught, the ſword is under the ſword, and temporal authority ſubject to the ſpiritual power, and that if the earthly power deviate, it ſhall be judged by the ſpiritual, an inferor ſpiritual, by a ſuperior; and the ſupream ſpiritual only by God. Neither does it make againſt this, that the definition of this Decretal ſeems revok'd by Clemen. 5. in the Extrav.*

trav. Merait. de Privileg. For Clement did not revoke the extravagant of Boniface, but informed us that it defined no new thing, but declared the ancient obligation, which men have to obey and be subject to the Apostolick Sea. Now I should think whether one *Pope* made a Decree, and another did not revoke it, matters not much, unless this Decree determine the point in question. And 'tis a clear case, there is not a word of *deposition* in this extravagant of *Boniface* 8, neither has *Bellarmin* remembred to tell us how 'tis implyed, which yet seems a material circumstance. That which he says we are taught by it, is that temporal authority is subject to spiritual power, & may be judged by it if it do amiss, but the supream spiritual Power by none but God. All this may be very true, and the Doctrine of *deposition* very false. When the temporal Sword is drawn by passion and strikes with injustice, as, to instance in an example us'd by himself, when *Theodosius* caused a number of innocent people to be slain at *Thessalonica*, a less man than the *Pope* had spiritual power enough to judg and punish this temporal power, or in plain *English* to shut the Church doors, and not admit the *Emperor* to a fellowship in Christian duties, till he had done what became a good Christian, repented and made satisfaction. Here the temporal Sword was under the spiritual Sword, judg'd and punisht by it, and all this while no deposition nor thought of any such thing. Of all who had their share in that business, none was better satisfi'd then the guilty and punisht *Emperor* himself, who more lov'd and honour'd S. *Ambrose* ever after. And 'tis likely if all spiritual Princes would imitate the zeal of that excellent Prelate, and preserving the respect due to the dignity of secular powers, strive only to redress the errors of their frailty, that Temporal Princes would imitate the Piety of that excellent *Emperor*, and there would be never any clashing betwixt them. But this by the by. I have only to do with the Argument, and 'tis not the least I have to do to find the force of it. For 'tis plain the bare words themselves, without a comment will not do, and *Bellarmin* has here forgotten to give a comment. And so there remains nothing but to rove at random, and hope, if luck serve, to hit right. If *Bellarmin* understand this Decree

In that manner in which he underſtood it who made it, *Boniface* the 8, as far as can be gathered by thoſe who writ of him, was perſwaded he was veſted in a Power as unlimited and abſolute as the wildeſt of Canoniſts ever fancied, that he was the only univerſal Monarch, and all Princes his ſubjects without more ado. You remember how he writes to the King of *France*: *We would have you know, you are ſubject to us both in ſpiritnals and temporals, and take for Hereticks who think otherwiſe.* Now there is one, in my opinion, very good reaſon why *Bellarmin* ſhould not underſtand the Decree in this manner, and that is becauſe he thinks that ſence not true, and maintains the *Pope* has no ſuch power, and the Canoniſts are out who give it him. If he will underſtand it as *Clement* 5 ſeems to underſtand it (you muſt pardon me if I entertein you with *ſeemings*, we muſt rove where we can do no better) it will amount to no more than bare ſpiritual power, as indeed the words themſelves carry no farther. *We neither will nor intend*, ſays he, *that any prejudice be done to the King or Kingdom of France* by the Decree in queſtion, *nor that the King, Kingdom, or Inhabitants be more ſubject to the Church of Rome then they were formerly, but that all things be in the ſame ſtate in which they were before the ſaid definition.* Now one point of the ſtate in which things were before, was, if we believe the King of *France*, as alſo *Innocent* 3, who had declared as much, that he was ſubject in temporals to no man. And ſo there remains only ſubjection in ſpirituals, in which *Clement* 5 underſtood the Decree, and challenged to the Church of *Rome*, and this will freely be allow'd to *Bellarmin* by a great many who for all that will allow no depoſition. Now becauſe neither of theſe Comments will fit him, as far as I perceive he will hardly find one ready made, but muſt take the pains to make one for himſelf, if he will do any thing. And yet when he has done, a Comment is one thing and a Text another. One is not altogether ſo current mony as the other. Although in this particular his comment muſt be better mettal then the Text it ſelf, or will hardly paſs. The whole Canon Law, the Decrees not only of particular *Popes*, but particular Councils, unleſs in circumſtances which happen not in this caſe, are freely and openly deny'd

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the power to oblige to belief. But I will not meddle with this point, which would draw on a new, and that controversial dispute, and I am no man of Controversy. What I have sayd is answer enough to an Argument no better prest. Yet I shall make one observation more, and so take leave of it.

This Canon according to the declaration of *Clement* 5 defined nothing new, says *Bellarmin*, but only declared the ancient obligation of being subject to the Apostolick Sea. Now would I fain understand how we should know by this Canon what that ancient obligation was. The question is whether the ancient subjection were in temporals or spirituals. And the Canon is declared to define neither the one nor the other, but only the ancient obligation; (and if it define nothing in the question, it might very well have been let alone) of necessity we must know what this ancient obligation is, before we can know what this Canon has defined; and then 'tis a clear case we can know nothing by the Canon, but must depend on another knowledg, and by that find out what the Canon sayes. If things be left by this Canon, as the *Pope* says they are, in the state in which they were before, it is not possible to know how this Canon left them, but by knowing how they were before. See now how well this Canon proves in the *Pope* a power over temporals, which says no more but that he has a power he alwaies had, but whether that power be temporal or spiritual is wholly silent. 'Tis something a new way of arguing, to bring us in proof, that things are as *Bellarmin* says they are, a Canon which says only they are as they were before, and force us to a new search to know how they were before, of which we have no intelligence from his Canon; but as far as we can have intelligence otherwise, have reason to think they were quite contrary to what *Bellarmin* pretends. For the *French*, who took themselves particularly concern'd in this Canon, did neither then nor since believe any obligation to be subject in temporals, and were unsatisfied till they procur'd this Declaration from *Clement* 5 that things were as they were before; and because this satisfied them 'tis in my opinion a strong proof that it was then known there was no subjection in temporals due before. However it be, the proof from the Canon stands plainly thus: You

must in vertue of this Canon believe the *Pope* has power over Temporals, becaufe he has a power which by the Canon you cannot know whether it be over temporals or no; Or, you muft know by the Canon the *Pope* has a temporal Power, which whether it be temporal or no you muft know from fomething elfe then the Canon: That is, I muft know in vertue of the Canon, what I cannot know in vertue of the Canon. Which proof being that in vertue whereof I know, fignifies the Canon is a proof, which is not a proof.

The third Argument is from Councils, and is thus propofed by *Bellarmin. We prove it thirdly from the Councils before mentioned, whereof the two laft were general For how can that be brought into doubt, or depend on the opinion of men, which general Catholick and lawful Councils approve? But thefe ten Councils, and efpecially the two laft of Lateran and Lyons do moft evidently teach that temporal Princes may be depos'd by the Pope, when the neceffity of the Church requires it, and confequently that the temporal Power of Princes is fubject, and fubordinate to the fpiritual power of Popes.* In my opinion he might have fpared that *confequently*. If lawful general Councils evidently teach Depofition, they teach enough of all confcience; we know well enough what will follow, without the help of his inferences, and know that twenty worfe things will follow then fubordination of powers. But is *Bellarmin* in earneft too? and will he reduce the Catholick Church to the narrow compafs of thofe who believe his Doctrine? How! Lawful general Concils teach, and that evidently, that Princes may be depofed! Why, what a hand has he made on't? His Friends, *Coton*, *Sourin*, and the reft of the Jefuites, who by a publick declaration difavow'd and deteftes this doctrine, were no very honeft men by his reckoning. The *French* are all direct Hereticks without more ado, and I fear it will go hard with the *Pope* himfelf, who fo freely and openly communicates with them. As for my fmall acquaintance, they are all in as bad a cafe as *Falftaffs* old Hofts, if fack be a fin. They'l be mall'd to my knowledg. If he do not make amends, with the weakneſs of his proofs, for the confidence of his aſſertions, we are all undone. But the comfort is that all Catholicks are not of his mind. For this very Book had the luck to light into a certain Catholick Country

Country where it was publickly condemn'd, and the men who did it, did not for all that think they contradicted any thing evidently taught by lawful general Councils. But let us see what those Councils say. The truth is, since of ten which he cites, 2 only are general, 8 might have been spared. For particular Councils, according to his own doctrine, are not so irrefragible, but what they determine may be brought into doubt. But we must take his Arguments as they are.

His first Council is, 900 years old, under *Greg.* 2. wherein he would make us believe the *Emperor Leo Isaurus* was excommunicated, and depriv'd of the tributes which he us'd to receive out of *Italy*. And this is one of the stories which *Onuphrius* takes for fables. *Bellarmin* alledges for proof (for the Council is not extant) the testimony of *Zonaras* a Greek Historian, whose words are these: *Gregory, who at that time ruled the Church of old Rome, involved them together with the Emperor in a synodical Anathema, and making a league with the French, forbad the tributes (which till that time were paid) from thence to the Empire.* *Barclay* answers, that he mistook the meaning of *Zonaras*, thinking that those 2 several things, because they are joyned in one period, hapned therefore at the same time. 'Tis true that either this *Pope*, or his Successor *Greg.* 3 did in a Synod excommunicate, not the Emperor particularly, but *Iconoclasts* in general. 'Tis true that *Greg.* 3. made a league with the *French*, or rather fled to their protection from the injuries of the *Lombards*, from which the *Emperor* either could, or perhaps would not defend him. And therefore Writers who say that after this league *Italy* withheld their usual Tributes, though the matter of fact be not altogether so clear, but none say they withheld them by the authority of any Council. As far as can be gathered the exasperated people were willing to keep their mony for their own defence, and not by sending it into *Greece*, expose themselves defenceless to those injuries which they either suffered or feared. And thus far there is mention of the *Pope*'s consent, and even countenance at last; for he opposed the sway of the people a good while, and by his authority preserv'd them in their allegeance to the *Emperor*, yet sided with them at long run, in this keeping their mony at home. But for deposing the

Emperor

Emperor much leſs in a Synod, neither he nor any body elſe thought of it, on the contrary to his dying day he acknowledged him his *Emperor* and Lord. Whether the People, or he did well in doing ſo much as they did, is another queſtion which belongs not to me to determin. But I ſuppoſe it is no wonderful thing, that a remote Province of a great Empire ſhould upon ſome diſſatisfaction fail at ſome time in their duty, and the men of greateſt Authority among them joyn with them. This is ſtanding upon their terms more then becomes ſubjects; but 'tis not depoſing, and much leſs depoſing by the Authority of thoſe great men who take their part. One might as well ſay the Prince of *Orange* by his Authority depoſed the King of *Spain* from the *Low Countries*, becauſe he was the Principal Actor, with thoſe who fell from him. But to make ſhort work with our caſe, there was in it, I think, no depoſition at all. But if this Tribute matter muſt be called depoſition, to that concur'd no Council; and betwixt them both 'tis plain there is no Argument.

There comes next in play the famous buſineſs of *Greg.* 7 which takes up 6 Councils more. Theſe becauſe they belong all to one ſubject, you ſhall give me leave to reſpit, till I have rid my hands of his next Council which belongs to another. 'Tis the Council of *Clerment.* where, he ſays, *Urban.* 2. excommunicated and depoſed *Philip.* 1. of *France* for caſting off his lawful Wife, marrying an Adultereſs, and refuſing upon admonition to make ſatisfaction. For this he cites M. *Paris*, and *Sigebert.* I have not ſeen *Sigebert*; but M. *Paris*, who particularizes the Acts of the Council, and among the reſt this excommunication, makes no mention of depoſing. I, but, ſayes *Bellarmin*, depoſition muſt be underſtood to go along with excommunication. Marry I thank him heartily. *Underſtood* quotha! Is our evident teaching come to underſtanding, and underſtanding thoſe things to be the ſame than which the world has none more different? Excommunication is a pure ſpiritual cenſure, and deprives a man of none but pure ſpiritual goods; depoſition is quite contrary, and takes away only temporal. It paſſes my underſtanding how one of theſe muſt neceſſarily follow out of the other. Pray why muſt we underſtand it does? Becauſe ſays he, Hiſtorians teſtify the

Pope

Pope forbad the Crown ſhould be ſet upon the Kings head while he remain'd excommunicate, and in particular *Ivo* Biſhop of *Chartres* writes to the *Pope*, that he would be threatned, unleſs he reſtored the Crown; and took off the excommunication, that the *King* and Kingdom would fall off from their obedience. Very well. Why then according to *Ivo*, there was a King ſtill, and that King had a Kingdom, and ſo much credit in it that 'twas not impoſſible but he might cauſe it to revolt. Theſe things do not hang together. A man may as ſoon underſtand how excommunication and depoſition infer one another, as how a Crown can be reſtor'd to one who is a King, and has a Kingdom; or how the *Pope* ſhould forbid the Crown to be ſet on his head, who had been crowned long before the *Pope* was *Pope*. 'Tis hard and not very wiſe to forbid things that are paſt. If this myſtery had not been unriddled for me, I had been quite at a loſs. But if I may believe *Barclay* and *Withrington*, it was at that time the cuſtom of *France* for the King to wear his Crown at ſolemn Feſtivals, and for ſome Biſhop to put it on his head. The *Pope* forbad the Biſhops to ſerve the King in this Ceremony, it ſeeming improper that perſons of their dignity in the Church, ſhould ſo far communicate with a man deſervedly lying under the cenſures of the Church, as to contribute to his honor, at the ſacred Offices. And this is all the Crown of which *Ivo* ſpeaks and talks of reſtoring. 'Twas at moſt a matter of pure ceremony, in which the *Pope* was not obey'd neither. For *Ivo* himſelf writs that, notwithſtanding his commands to the contrary, Biſhops were found, who performed that Office to the King. But for the reſt, the Kings reign was neither interrupted nor diſquieted. *France* giving a very good example of the duty of ſubjects in that caſe, when in the words of *Paulus Æmilius*, they preſerv'd inviolate the Majeſty of a faulty Prince, and yet themſelves degenerated not from the holineſs of their Anceſtors. I mention not his additional proof from *Vignier*, becauſe he had better have let him alone, ſince *Barclay* has caught him tardy, and ſhew'd that what *Vignier* ſays related to another *Philip* who liv'd a hundred years after this *Philip* of whom *Bellarmin* ſpeaks. And I conceive He might as well have let alone the Council of *Clermont* as *Vignier*, for there is no proof that the King was depos'd by or in it.

To return now to *Greg.*7. He says, *Bellarmin*, in a Synod at *Rome* publickly and solemnly and ceremoniously, with the consent and applause of all present, deposed and excommunicated the *Emperor Henry* 4. And to this Synod must be added 5 more held by his Successors, at *Beneventum* by *Victor* 3 *Piacenza* by *Urban* 2. *Rome* by *Pasthal* 2. *Colen* by *Gelasius* 2. and *Rhemes* by *Calistus* 2. in which the sentence of *Gregory* 7 was confirmed. Of these six, if *Jo. Barclay* say true, five are plainly nothing to the matter: For there is not a word of deposition in any of them. There is mention of Excommunication sometimes of the *Emperor* himself, sometimes of the *Anti-Pope* set up by the *Emperor* and his complices; but deposition not so much as once named. Besides *Henry* 4. with whom *Greg.*7. had to do, was dead before the times of *Gelasius* and *Calistus*; to make them renue the sentence of deposition given first by *Greg.*7. is a great inadvertence. 'Tis true all his Successors kept up the quarrel about Lay-investitures, and that occasioned all the Decrees he mentions, and some more remembred by *Schulkenius*, till *Calistus* with a wise and successful piety compos'd the difference. And I think it cannot be imagined he should depose the *Emperor* with whom he treated and concluded Peace. There remains only the fact of *Greg.* 7. himself, and that indeed past in a Council; but what share the Council had in it, is something obscure. I suspect he was more beholding to his Rhetorick for those flourishing additions of the consent and applause of all present, then the warrant of any good authority. For *Platina* says expressly there were some present so far from being fully satisfi'd, that they urg'd, a King was not to be excommunicated so soon. And the Decree it self mentions neither consent, nor privity of any besides the *Pope*, whose act the stile makes it, and that so entirely, that were it not known by other means, it could never be discovered by the sentence, that there was any such thing as a Council then in being. The truth is, the *Pope* was smartly provoked. For, besides that he had been forcibly seized on, even at the Altar, and hurried into prison, from whence he was the next day rescued by the people, a Synod of *Worms* called by the *Emperor*, had little better then deposed him first, *We denounce unto you*, say they, *that as we have promised*

miſed no obedience to you, ſo from henceforth we mean to pay none. In conſequence of this Decree one *Roland* a Clergyman of *Parma* was ſent to *Rome*, and there publickly forbad the *Pope* to act as *Pope* for the future, and commanded the *Cardinals* to leave him, and repair to the *Emperor*, to receive another *Pope*. Whether he had not begun with the *Emperor* is another queſtion. There are who think he had. But however to be ſo ſharply dealt with would make a man look about him. And 'tis clear, this buſineſs at *Worms* hapned before his ſentence at *Rome*, where 'tis very likely they might think they had as much power to to depoſe the *Emperor*; as they in *Germany* to depoſe the *Pope*. If I may be permitted to ſpeak with freedom I ſhould think this counter-authority of Councils one againſt another (for it was not only *Pope* againſt *Emperor*, but Council againſt Council) is a more proper argument of human frailty, then Catholick doctrine. One may perceive that Princes never fall out, but there will be partakers on both ſides, and that among thoſe who are leaſt liable to the ſuſpition of being ſway'd to injuſtice, the wiſeſt and graveſt and of greateſt dignity. But how any thing ſhould be efficaciouſly concluded from Councils, which are oppoſed by other Councils, as many, as full, conſiſting of perſons, the *Pope* excepted, equal in dignity and reputation whether for learning or vertue, is hard to conceive. Tumult and Bitterneſs and Animoſity are no very proper diſpoſitions for the calm and gentle operations of the H. Spirit; and ſuch there were at that time, or elſe the world was then a great deal more holy then now. There was among them that would have cauſed paſſion among us, and things were done by them which paſſionate people do with us, where we ſee the fruits we cannot but ſuſpect the Tree. The *Emperor* for his part had the *Pope* to countenance the *Saxons* againſt him, and by his ſpiritual authority counterpoiſe the weight of his arms. This would vex a man of a high ſpirit, ambitious of glory, and impatient of contradiction unleſs he were a Saint, which is not written of that *Emperor*. On the other ſide, the *Pope* had the *Emperor* averſe to the liberality then intended, and after brought to effect, of the Counteſs *Mathildis*, and unwilling ſo great an occaſion ſhould be made to the Church of lands,

to which, if I miſtake not, the *Emperor* pretended. He muſt be a very great Saint too if he could look upon the hopes of ſo great an advantage without paſſion, and not be tempted to weaken a man whom he ſaw would croſs him as much as he could. Theſe reaſons for animoſity, among others, there were and if they did not work, they were the holyer men. But I think no man is bound to believe that the pretences uſed in matters of great conſequence, are alwaies the true cauſes: neither is it hard when people are reſolved to fall out, and ſet the beſt face they can each on his ſeveral ſide, by ſome means or other to draw in the pretence of Religion, which as it carries the faireſt ſhew, is generally neareſt at hand. But I rove too far with my fools bolt. Thoſe who were Actors in theſe matters, have long ſince given account to an Impartial Judg, nor have I to do with their intentions, but *Bellarmin*'s argument; which in two words I conceive little efficacious, both becauſe the concurrence of the Council ſeems queſtionable, farther than as it happens ſometimes in conſiſtories, where matters are propos'd in ſome caſes for forms ſake, and ſhall be executed as they are prereſolved, however the Cardinals vote. And though it were not, the Council at moſt is but a particular Council, which according to *Bellarmin* himſelf is of no irrefragable and binding authority. For the reſt 'twere ſtrange, if the *Pope* ſhould not find Biſhops enough to joyn with the ſpiritual power, when the *Emperor* wanted not who ſtuck as faſt to the temporal. And ſo much to 8 of the 10 Councils.

We are now at —*Paulo majora canamus.* The two Councils which remain are propos'd with more pomp, and in truth challenge a greater reſpect, as being general Councils both. The firſt is that of *Lateran* under *Innocent* 3. out of which is urged the famous Canon known by every one, and which for as much as concerns us, runs Thus—*But if a temporal Lord required and admoniſht by the Church, neglect to purge his land from this Heretical filth, let him be excommunicated by his Metropolitan, and Com-provincial Biſhops. And if he ſtand in contempt, and make not ſatisfaction within a year, let the Pope be made acquainted, that he may from that time declare his Vaſſals abſolved from their fealty to him, and expoſe his lands to be feiz'd on by Catholicks, who chacing*

chacing away the Hereticks may without contradiction poſſeſs, and preſerve it in the purity of Faith, ſaving the right of the principal Lord, provided he bring no obſtacle nor hindrance to the Premiſes, obſerving nevertheleſs the ſame rule with them who have no principal Lords. Bellarmin is wonderfully agog with this. *What*, ſays he, *would Barclay ſay here? If this be not the voice of the Catholick Church where ſhall we find it? and if it be, as moſt truly it is, he that out of contempt, as Barclay hears it not, is he not to be eſteemed a Heathen and a Publican, and in no manner a Chriſtian and pious? If the Pope have not power on earth to diſpoſe of temporals, even to the depoſition of thoſe Princes who either are Hereticks themſelves, or any way favour Hereticks, why, at the ſetting out this Canon, did none of ſo great a number make oppoſition? Why of ſo many Embaſſadors of Emperors and Kings not one who durſt ſo much as mutter? Theſe Paraſites to temporal Princes were not yet ſprung up, who under pretence of eſtabliſhing temporal Kingdoms take away the eternal Kingdom from thoſe whom they flatter.* I marry! here's a fit of triumphant zeal. But I ſuppoſe if he had caſt a little water on the flame, it would have been hot enough for the occaſion. This *Paraſites* and *Flatterers*, *Heathens*, *Publicans* and *Impious* are expreſſions a little too zealous. In what a caſe are they who condemn'd all this zeal, and had they not had more reſpect to his Purple then his argument, in all likelyhood had burnt it too? and yet had as good ears in the opinion of the world, as *Bellarmin*, and could hear the voice of the Catholick Church as ſoon. But to be ſerious, what *Barclay* would have ſaid here, I cannot tell; but I ſuppoſe if Death had not ſtopt his mouth, he would have ſaid ſomething: For this Canon is no ſuch ſecret that he could be imagin'd ignorant of it, or unprovided againſt it. At leaſt his ſon did find ſomething to ſay for him, to which I can no more tell what *Bellarmin* would ſay, then he could what *Barclay* would ſay to the Council. I ſhall have occaſion to mention part of what he ſays by and by. In the mean time as this Council never fails to be layd in the way of all who travel this road, people have ſeveral turns to avoid it.

There are who queſtion whether any thing at all was defined there, at leaſt in a Conciliar way, or if any thing were defin'd that the world was duly made acquainted with the buſineſs. For which, beſides that ſome Hiſtorians

expreſly ſay nothing was concluded, they have theſe preſumptions. The Canons, which we have, diſcover by their ſtile that they were not made in the Council. They run ſome of them in this manner: *It was pionſly provided in the Lateran Council*——*'Tis known 'twas forbid in the Lateran Council*, &c. which are phraſes very unlikely to have been uſed by the Council, if that fram'd the Decrees. Again, the whole authority of this Council reſts as far as I ſee upon one *Cochlæus* The Councils had been ſet out, and this omitted, either not known, or not procurable by him, who managed the buſineſs. Againſt another Edition this *Cochlæus* furniſht the Preſs with the Copy which we now have. Whence he had it himſelf, I know not; but methinks the credit of a private man is a weak ſupport for a matter of this conſequence. Beſides how much time ought in reaſon be allow'd to a Conciliar diſcuſion and determination of threeſcore Canons. *Carenza* has threeſcore and ten, and ſomewhere I have heard of another number, which diſagreement by the way is a ſuſpicious thing. M. *Paris* tells us the Council was ſummoned for the firſt of *Nov.* and met, I ſuppoſe, at the day. The *Pope* firſt makes an exhortation, afterwards cauſes 60 Chapters to be read, and concludes with a ſecond exhortation concerning the H. Land. All this, as far as can be gather'd by him, paſt in one day; which if it did, the Council could not poſſibly contribute more than the hearing to any thing. Beſides he plainly ſays theſe 60 Chapters to ſome appear'd eaſy, to others burthenſome; which is very far from a Conciliar approbation. Now he ſays not preciſely when the Council ended, but 'tis apparent by him that it laſted not long. The *Pope* in this Council at the Kings inſtance ſuſpends the Arch-Biſhop of *Canterbury*. This ſuſpenſion bears date *pridie nonas* or *4th. Nov.* Beſides he vacats the election of his Brother *Simon Langton* to the Sea of *York*, and excommunicates the Barons of *England*. Theſe ſentences are not recorded as the other; but in liklyhood paſt at the ſame time. M. *Paris* mentions immediately the end of the Council. *Quo facto* after which, ſays he, two of the three Agents which the King of *England* had there, returned to bring him the good news. They found him at *Rocheſter*, from whence he marched to St. *Albans*, and came thither

thither time enough to have the ſuſpenſion of the Arch-Biſhop atteſted by the ſeal of the Convent 13 *Calend. Jan.* or 20 *Decemb.* By this account how long could the Council laſt? Or how much time could be ſpent in duly weighing ſo many Canons, ſome of ſuch importance, when men who had ſeen the concluſion of the Council which began not before *Nov.* were in *England* by the 20*th.* of *December*? He has beſides a ſecond ſentence of the *Popes* againſt the Barons of *England* by name, wherein he ſpeaks in this manner. *We would have you know that lately in a General Council we did excommunicate and anathematize the Barons of England—moreover we do excommunicate and anathematize—We aggravate our hand more ſtrongly againſt them*, &c. This bears date 17 *Calend. Jan.* the 16 *Decemb.* of the ſame year, and 'tis clear by the *Pope*'s expreſſions that before this time the Council was ended; and it may be had been a good while. If theſe 60 Canons were all examined with that maturity which becomes a Council, and ſo decreed, Councils at that time were much nimbler then now a dayes. If proceedings then had one quarter of the flegm we uſe now their ſuſpicion is not altogether without ground, who think the conſultations, then on foot were interrupted by the breaking out of ſuddain wars, and nothing brought to concluſion.

Withrington takes another exception to this Canon, which he ſays comes not home to the purpoſe, nor can by the rules of Law be interpreted to extend to Soveraign Princes; becauſe, as he ſays, in conſtruction of Law ſuch Princes, at leaſt in penal, or as they call them odious matters, are never underſtood to be included in general words, as *Lords*, *Magiſtrates* and the like, no more then the *Pope* when only *Biſhop* is named, or Abbot by the word *Monk*. If it had been meant of Soveraign Princes, it had been as eaſy to have named them expreſly, as temporal Lords, and they were ſo named in other Decrees even of this Council. Beſides this very Decree, in the very ſame words, changing only ſpiritual puniſhments into temporal, was publiſht within 5 years by the *Emperor*, and it cannot be imagined he meant to make Soveraign Princes ſubject to his Laws, or had power ſo to do though he meant it.

Theſe and ſeveral other things may be ſay'd, but in my opinion they need not: for there is another anſwer free from the

the intricacies whether of Law or Hiſtory, and which to my apprehenſion is both eaſy and plain. Every body knows that Decrees of Councils are of two ſorts. Some declare what is to be believed, others preſcribe ſomething to be done. And every body knows that theſe two are of very different natures. To refuſe Decrees of Faith, is to renounce the communion of that Church whoſe Repreſentative the Council is, that is, the whole Church, if the Council be general, unleſs there be a juſt exception againſt their proceeding. For Faith is that by which a Church is a Church, and if you be of a different Faith, you cannot be of the ſame Church. But for the other ſort of Decrees, when they concern civil matters, becauſe thoſe whoſe buſineſs it is to manage them are ſuppoſed to be better acquainted with them then ſpiritual men, whoſe buſineſs it is to attend to ſpirituals, neither reaſon nor cuſtom allows them any force, till they be received by particular Countries, and by that reception made binding. For it were very unreaſonable one Law ſhould bind all Countries, when that which is convenient in one place may be and often is prejudicial in another. We in *England* acknowledg no Law but by conſent of *Parliament*. In *France* they require *Verification*, as they call it, in their higheſt Courts of Juſtice. Every Country has its particular method; but what has not paſt this teſt is currant no where. And this is a notorious thing, for default of which, there is none who knows not that theſe kind of Decrees of the Council of *Trent* are not obliging in *France* to this day. Again, tis equally notorious that the Canon in queſtion is of this ſecond ſort. Wherefore 'tis as plain as can be, that unleſs it can be made appear. It has been duly receiv'd, and by ſuch reception become binding, of itſelf it is not binding any where, I mean where both powers are not united to command it For where the *Pope* has the Authority of a temporal Prince there both powers concur. I forbear to touch ſeveral things mentioned pertinently enough. As, how Biſhops in Council ſhould order temporal penalties, who out of Council (unleſs they have a ſhare of temporal power communicated otherwiſe to them) cannot go beyond ſpiritual. A Congregation of Biſhops is but ſo many Biſhops, nor is it eaſy to conceive how their meeting together ſhould inveſt them

them with an authority of another kind and such as is not proper to Bishops. To which purpose a famous Canonist upon occasion of temporal penalties, inflicted by a certain Canon, inquires what the *Pope* had to do with temporals, and answers, truly nothing; but he ordered that penalty in vertue of the *Emperors* consent, who was present and approv'd it. So that when Councils make such kind of Decrees, 'twill be hard to make out any other Authority by which they make them, than the consent of Princes concern'd. But these considerations, and several other I pass by, the former being plain in it self and plainly doing the business. The Decree in question is of that kind which all the world knows is not binding but where, and only where tis receiv'd. Either produce this reception, or tis to no more purpose to urg it, then to alledg the authority of a Bill thrown out of one of the Houses, or not assented to by the King. Upon the whole, if there had gone a little more knowledg to *Bellarmin*'s zeal, 'twould have been so much the better: He undertakes to prove that general Councils teach evidently that Princes may be depos'd by the *Pope*, and brings in proof a Decree which teaches nothing, but orders that which none is bound to obey, unless he live in a Country who have made it a Law to themselves, if any such Country there be. And if this be his evident teaching, it will be concluded that his Doctrine in this point can be taught no otherwise then by a teaching, which evidently is no teaching.

Bellarmin concludes with the Council of *Lyons* under *Innocent* 4. in which there was publisht a sentence of deposition against the *Emperor Frederick* 2. This as Art requires at a close, he sets forth as gloriously as he can. Having related the later part of the sentence; *This*, says he, *is the sentence of the Soveraign Bishop with approbation of the whole Council, that is with the consent and praise of the Universality of Christian Prelates. And yet one, I know not who, dares dispute against it, and publish his Book, and cast a mist before the eyes of the simple*; and so goes on to the end of the Chapter, amplifying the boldness and rashness of standing in opposition to so many and so learned, and so holy men, whom for the greater solemnity he gathers all into one great Council,

excom-

excommunicating and depoſing by Apoſtolick Authority Heretical Princes, or Patrons of Hereticks; And upon this fancy of making one Council of all ages he is ſo intent, that he quite forgets that Heretical Princes were no part of the caſe in any Age, nor ever thought of by any of his Councils, ſave only that of *Lateran*. To fancy them all into one Council is well enough: but to fancy them doing there what, when they are aſſembled in reality, they dreamt not of, has ſomething too much of fancy. Then this *favouring of Hereticks* is a term ſo general that I know not how far it extends, but I think Princes make alliances as they are guided by intereſt of State, and amuſe not themſelves with theſe ſpeculations of Schoolmen. The *French* never bogled to make leagues with Princes of different Religions, which though it has been ſometimes caſt in their diſh, they left not for all that to do what they thought fitting. 'Tis now come about, and the Houſe of *Auſtria* does what heretofore they blam'd in the *French*, and the *Pope* is much bely'd if he quarrel with them for it. It is not much more boldneſs and raſhneſs to ſtand upon our terms with his Councils, being ſuch as they are, then to condemn to excommunication and depoſition ſuch as are capable of it, all this part of the world. For ſure Repreſentatives are not ſo much more conſiderable than the Bodies themſelves: But I rove as well as *Bellarmin*.

Before I ſpeak to the to the Council, it will not be amiſs to obſerve that the caſe of the *German Emperors* has ſomething not common with other abſolute Princes, and the caſes of *Frederic* 2 and *Henry* 4 ſomething not common with other *Emperors*. For 'tis well obſerv'd by *John Barclay* that ſince the tranſlation of the Empire to the Weſt, at leaſt ſince the devolution from the poſterity of *Charles* the *Great* to the *Germans*, *Popes* have pretended a particular ſuperiority over thoſe *Emperors*. One of them in a certain Canon will needs have the Oath which *Emperors* take at their Coronation to be properly an Oath of Fidelity. Another taxes the *Emperor* of inſolence and arrogance for ſetting his name before the *Popes*, as being contrary to the fidelity promiſt and ſworn to S. *Peter* himſelf. In conſequence whereof

Clem. 5. Clementina Vinc. de Jurejur.

Adrian Ep. ad Fred. 7.

whereof

there are who maintain the *Pope* may depoſe the *Emperor*, for this reaſon, becauſe he acknowledges his Temporalties from the *Pope*, and in plain terms that the Empire and *Emperor* are ſubject to the *Pope*. I have nothing to do with the juſtice of this pretence, let the *Germans* look to that, who, I ſuppoſe, are not all of the ſame opinion: but 'tis manifeſt *Popes* have made this claim, and if they act in conſequence of what they publickly maintain and treat as ſubjects thoſe whom they took to be ſo, and deal with them as ſupream Lords with their Inferiors and Vaſſals, as it is not to be wondred at, ſo the caſe is quite different from that of abſolute Princes, over whom there is no pretence of ſuperiority. Again, this *Frederick* had poſitively ſworn by *Embaſſadors* particularly authoriz'd to ſtand to the Judgment of the *Pope* and Church. *Henry* 4. had done as much in perſon at *Canoſſa*, upon the recalling of his firſt ſentence. How far this ſubmiſſion of theirs ſubjected thoſe two *Emperors* to the cenſures of the Church, at leaſt how far it might be thought to ſubject them, I cannot ſay. But certainly ſuch an obligation makes their condition different from thoſe who never entred into ſuch bonds.

It will not be amiſs likewiſe to reflect a little upon the temper of thoſe times. As far as I can get a Proſpect of them, they were leſs critical then ours, and more led by nature than ſpeculation. When a miſchief hapned they thought 'twas fit there ſhould be a remedy, and as drowning men think not of the treſpaſs, and whether the twig they catch at grow on their neighbours ground, if the temporal Power wrong'd them, had recourſe to the ſpiritual, and if the ſpiritual to the temporal. So the *Emperor Otho* was ſollicited to relieve them againſt *John* 12 and did ſo, cauſing him to be depos'd, and a better choſen in his room. And every body thought he did well, even *Bellarmin* himſelf (though withal he thinks the action not ſo regular) becauſe that *Pope* was a very wicked man. Beſides, the *Pope* was believ'd the Father and Head of all Chriſtians, and upon that account obedience due to him from all. How far and to what kind of actions this obedience extended, they ſeem to have ſo little conſidered that *Greg.* 7. himſelf anſwers, thoſe who were not ſatisfi'd with his haſty ſentence, as if it were all one to have power over all and to have all Power. It was this Council of *Lyons* which made men begin to look about them. *Plat. in Greg.* 7.

and consider the matter more deeply. For then, says M. *Paris* both Princes and Prelates foreseeing the consequences were exceedingly troubled. For though *Frederick* himself did many ways deserve to be lessened and depriv'd of all honor, yet to be depos'd by *Papal* authority, would raise the Church of *Rome* to that height and pride that abusing the Grace of God they might fall to deposing even innocent and good Princes, and sooner Prelates, and this for slight causes, or at least threaten to depose them, *&c.* But whatever they thought afterwards, when they reflected the *Pope* was a man as well as his Neighbours, and might abuse an unlimited power, at the Council of *Lyons* I conceive they were more intent to consider who had right of his side, then with what kind of penalty they were impour'd to chastise the wrong. The *Emperors* Agents were heard, and notwithstanding all they could say in his behalf, and they spoke freely enough, He was in the opinion of the whole Council manifestly guilty. Even those who favour'd him at first, confest he deserv'd to be depos'd. And if the rest thought no injustice done him, who had but what he deserved, I think the wonder is not great.

However it be to answer more directly, divers things they say, They question the coucurrence of the Council, and think *Bellarmin* a little more confident then became him, to talk of the *approbation* and *consent* and *praise* of the whole Council, when the Decree is so far from authorizing his confidence, that on the contrary it affords just suspicion of the contrary. For whereas the usual stile of conciliar Acts, and elsewhere us'd even in this very Council, runs in this manner, *sacro approbante Concilio*, 'tis changed here into this, *sacro præsente Concilio*, which they think not done without a particular reason. Again, Historians mention the horror and astonishment of the by-standers at the pronouncing the sentence, effects not likely to proceed from an Act of their own. In fine, several exceptions they take. But the best answer in my opinion is afforded by *Bellarmin* himself. He teaches elsewhere, that in Councils the greatest part of the Acts belong not to Faith, neither Disputations, nor Reasons, nor Explications, but the bare Decrees themselves, and those not all, but only such as are propos'd for Faith. This being admitted, as it is universally, the difficulty is plainly answered. For 'tis as plain as can be, that here is nothing propos'd for Faith.

Lib. 2. de Concil. c. 12.

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The *Emperor* is depos'd, his depoſition is that which is decreed and that is propos'd as a thing to be done, not believed. To depoſe is one thing, to define they have power to depoſe is another. Had they made ſuch a Decree and obliged all Chriſtians under *Anathema* to believe, it had been to purpoſe to alledg it. But as far as I can learn, there was no thought of any ſuch thing in the Council. Now for Acting, People may act, and ſometimes very rationally upon probable grounds, and ſuch as none are bound to believe. And they may have very good grounds for acting in one caſe, which themſelves may not think ſufficient in another. It is very unreaſonable out of a particular action to conclude a power which ſhall extend to all caſes, when from the bare action there is no neceſſity of believing a power even in that caſe. The moſt that can be made of it is, that the Council ſuppos'd, or took for granted they had power to do what they did. And it may be they had. For the *Emperor* had ſworn particularly to ſtand to the Judgment of the Church: He pleaded in this Council by his Procurators, who when they ſaw things go againſt them, made no exception to the Juriſdiction of the Court, but appeal'd to a future Council more general, pretending all were not preſent who had right to ſit there. But why may not a Council take for granted more then every body is obliged to grant? This ſuppoſition of theirs was undoubtedly one of the Reaſons of their Decree. And *Bellarmin* aſſures us we are not bound to believe any of their reaſons. So that for his particular, he had no reaſon to expect this Decree ſhould cauſe belief in any. But whether he had or no, this is plain without him, That where there is nothing to be believ'd there can be no belief, and where there is nothing, in his languag, propos'd for Faith, there is nothing to be believ'd. Here is ſomething commanded, but nothing defin'd, and as ſure as no Maſs no hundred Mark, no Definition, no Article of Faith. Wherefore I cannot ſufficiently wonder to ſee learned men lay ſo blindly about them, ſome with great formality citing the Council and heightning its authority by reckoning up the number and quality of thoſe who met there; others ſtriving to diminiſh it by conſulting Hiſtorians, and carefully obſerving all exceptions they afford; when all this while the Authority of it neither applys it ſelf, nor can be applyed to the matter in hand. For tis evident they defined nothing, one way or other, and

afford us no more then a bare matter of fact, past indeed in, or by a Council, but whatever be true, or whether the Fact were just or unjust, our belief is not a jot concern'd, and this even by the confession of those who most urg the Council. The Fate of eager Disputers is upon us, with much ado we are where we were again; and must either be taught this Doctrine by Decrees which teach nothing, or which neither are, nor were intended for teaching Decrees, or not to be taught it all, as far as I perceive For this is the sum total of his ten Councils.

His fourth and last Argument is, He says, from Scripture; and if you will pardon a scurvy pun, tis indeed very far from it, so far that one would not readily perceive what Scripture has to do with it. As tedious as it is to transcribe, I must submit to the pains of setting down, and you to the patience of reading his whole Discourse; for fear I should be suspected of wronging it by contracting. *Fourthly*, says he, *We prove it from the divine writings, as Greg. 7 proves it in 21 Epistle of the 8 Book. For we find the Ecclesiastical Primacy of the Bishop of Rome most manifestly founded on Scripture and Tradition, in which Primacy is contained most ample Power of governing, binding and loosing whomsoever, even Kings and Emperors: and this neither Barclay, nor any Catholick denies. But out of this principle is gathered plainly enough, that there is in the Bishop of Rome a power to dispose of temporals, even to the deposition of those Kings and Emperors. For by that spiritual Power the Pope can bind secular Princes by the bond of excommunication; by the same he can loose the people from their Oath of Fidelity and Obedience; he can oblige the same People, under pain of Excommunication, not to obey the excommunicated King, and chuse them another. Besides, since the end of spiritual government is the gaining eternal life, which is the supream and last end to which all other ends are subordinate; of necessity all secular Power must be subject and subordinate to the spiritual power of the supream Ecclesiastical Hierarch; which (secular power) he is to direct, and if it deviate, correct and judge, and in fine bring to pass that it hinder not the salvation of Christian people. And this is the reason why both Greg. 7 and Innocent 4. when they depos'd Emperors, to shew they did it justly, alledg'd the words of our Lord:* Whatever you shall bind on Earth shall be bound in Heaven, and whatever you shall loose on Earth, shall be loosed in Heaven. *Mat.* 16. *And* feed my Sheep. *Jo.* 21. *namely to signify that their power to dispose of temporals, when the salvation of souls, the safety of Religion, and preservation of the Church require*

require it, depends not on the uncertain opinions of men, but the divine Ordination of Christ, the eternal King and higheſt Biſhop, and who above all is God bleſſed for ever, *according to the Apoſtle*, Rom. 11.

This is every word of what he calls proof from Scripture; if you or any elſe think it ſo, you ſhall find me reaſonable. But indeed it ſticks with me. Let us ſee, *The Eccleſiaſtical Primacy of the Pope*, ſays he, *is founded in Scripture and Tradition, and this Primacy extends to Kings and Emperors, and contains moſt ample power, of governing, binding and looſing, and this no Catholick denies.* Very well; and becauſe I muſt acknowledg my ſelf a *Catholick*, I muſt acknowledg I think it all very true. Thus far we are right. Only I take this moſt ample Power to mean no more then moſt ample Eccleſiaſtical power, for that is all which Eccleſiaſtical Primacy imports; which Eccleſiaſtical Power, that it extends to Kings and Emperors, no King nor Emperor, who acknowledges the Eccleſiaſtical Primacy, ſcruples to admit. For they take themſelves to be part of the flock of Chriſt, and claim their ſhare in the benefit of the Keys, as well as others. *But out of this Principle*, ſays he, *the depoſing Power is plainly gathered.* The Controverſy ſure will quickly be at an end now. Scripture is acknowledged on all hands, and what is plainly there, or may be plainly deduc'd from thence, will find a ready ſubmiſſion from every body. And though I ſuſpect this *Gathering* will go near to take the buſineſs out of the hands of Scripture; yet, ſince it is no great matter who does it, ſo the Miracle be done, let us only obſerve at preſent how he gathers this plain inference of his, and how it follows, if the *Pope* be inveſted with the Power belonging to Eccleſiaſtical Primacy, he is inveſted likewiſe with the Power of depoſing Kings. It is worth while to attend a little to a matter of this conſequence, and a little attention will ſerve turn, where things are ſo plain. Pray, how does this follow ſo plainly? why thus ſays *Bellarmin*; *Becauſe the Pope by his ſpiritual Power can bind even Kings with the bond of Excommunication.* Suppoſe he can; what then? *And by the ſame he can looſe people from their Oath of Fidelity and Obedience, and oblige them under excommunication not to obey the former excommunicated King, but chuſe them a new one.* How! He can abſolve ſubjects from the duty of Obedience, and oblige them to chuſe a new King. Why this is the very thing call'd Depoſing, and if he can depoſe, undoubtedly he can depoſe. But whether he can do this, is the thing in queſti-

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on, and what he undertook to prove by a plain collection out of Scripture, and does he offer us for proof the very thing to be prov'd? This it neither proving nor gathering, but saying twice over, what they, who deny once, will deny as often as it is or can be repeated, till it be prov'd. Tis in plain terms to say, he can loose the band of Allegeance, therefore he can loose the band of Allegeance, or he can Depose, therefore he can Depose. In good earnest I should not easily have believed that such a man as *Bellarmin* should have over-seen himself so much: But I perceive the greatest men that are, are men, and have their failings. And though I should not have run proud of my own wit, if I alone had observ'd a defect so palpable, yet I must needs confess I am not the first discoverer. *Jo. Barclay* has been before me, (and it may be as many as have considered the Argument) as the truth is I say, almost nothing which I have not from others. If you remember I engaged no farther then to acquaint you what others say, and I am as good as my word. But it is so tedious and hobling a labor to be alwayes going over and over again with *This man says that*, and *t'other man the other*, that I cannot endure alwaies to cite my Authors. But to retnrn to our matter; All we have here in proof of the deposing power, is that the *Pope* has it: which he that will take for a proof, may; but I fear that who believs it for that reason, had as good believe it for no reason at all. And how much soever there may be of Reason, I verily think there is little of Scripture in it.

There follows the subordination of the two Powers, from the subordination of their ends which is one of the 5 Arguments related in my former Letter, and which to repeat again I suppose would be as ungrateful to you, as tedious to me. But there *Bellarmin* alledg'd it as an Argument from Reason, and how he comes here to intitle it to Scripture I cannot gues. The truth is I am wholly to seek why these two together, and these two are all, which belong to this Head, should be called proof from Scripture, when no place of Scripture is so much as alledged. He assumes indeed that Ecclesiastical Primacy is founded in Scripture and Tradition. But this is part of the question. No Catholick disputes it with him. The question is whether the Scripture teach the deposing Power is joyned to that Primacy. I would fain see that place of Scripture which teaches this. When *Bellarmin* undertook to prove his doctrine

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by Scripture, I expected, as I think any man would, he ſhould produce ſome place which teaches it either expreſly, or ſo that it might plainly be gathered from it. And inſtead of this he brings us one reaſon, ſuch as it is, and another which is not ſo much as a reaſon, but a bare ſaying over what he was to prove, and this he calls proof from Scripture.

He cites indeed in the Proceſs of his diſcourſe. *Mat.* 16. and *Jo.* 21. but does not go about to ſhew how they are to his purpoſe; only by way of Hiſtory tells us that two *Popes* alledg'd them, to ſhew that they dealt juſtly, and that the power they challenged, is not founded on uncertain opinions, but divine Authority. Undoubtedly theſe *Popes* had reaſon to deſire it ſhould be thought they dealt juſtly, and that this power of theirs was not founded on uncertain opinions. And every body knows they have alledged thoſe places and more. But every body is not ſatisfied with thoſe allegations, nor can perceive by them that divine Authority does indeed warrant their depoſing claim, neither does *Bellarmin* contribute any thing to their ſatisfaction. They find in S. *Hierom that the ſpiritual Key extends it ſelf not to Temporals without arrogance*; and ſome body elſe from S. *Jo. Chryſoſtom* has told them, *that by the Keys is not underſtood any power given, but ſpiritual, to abſolve from the bond of Sin*, and *that it were fooliſh to underſtand it of a Power to abſolve from the bond of debt*. And if they think it as wiſe to underſtand it ſo, as to underſtand it of a Power to abſolve from the bond of Allegeance, they may do ſo for *Bellarmin*. But you have a great deal to this purpoſe cited formerly, and much more might be added if it were neceſſary; by which it may be gather'd, ſomething more plainly then *Bellarmin* gathers, that the Church underſtood not the power of the *Keys* as thoſe *Popes* would have us underſtand the 16 of S. *Mathew*. The like is of the other place of *Feeding*: of which you obſerv'd unhappily that to underſtand it of Depoſing, is to think Chriſt meant his Sheep ſhould be fed with knocks. Upon that occaſion you know I brought you S. *Bernard*, affirming that to *feed* is no more then to *Evangelize. Fac opus Evangeliſtæ, & Paſtoris munus impleſti.* I could eaſily produce Authority enough for the right ſence of this place: But another of the 5 Arguments mention'd in my laſt being drawn from hence, you ſee there are all that *Bellarmin* could make of it, which I have no mind to ſay again.

Several other Arguments there are ſcattered up and down

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by ſeveral Authors. But I take theſe to be the principal. At leaſt they are thoſe which *Bellarmin* choſe, and he being look'd upon as the Principal Patron of this opinion, I think it needles to look after more, and in his judgment worſe. It is now time to acquaint you with the arguments produc'd on the other ſide, and the anſwers to them. You ſhall permit me to contract them into as little room as I can: for my Letter ſwells, and I am weary both of writing and of the ſubject. I take them out of *Withrington* and *Barclay*, who being the lateſt writers, I ſuppoſe have ſeen what was ſayd before, though the truth is I am forc'd to uſe them more by neceſſity then choice, my library not affording me thoſe former Books whom I would gladly ſee.

The firſt, ſays *Withrington*, is like that which *Bellarmine* makes againſt thoſe who aſſert a *direct* Temporal Power in the Pope. *If the Pope have, and that by Divine Right, power to depoſe Princes in order to ſpiritual good, this muſt appear either by Scripture or Tradition. Tradition is not pretended. Out of Scripture, the two chief places are thoſe now mentioned*, Mat. 16. and Joh. 21. *both which he endeavours to ſhew are meant only of ſpiritual power.* To this *Schulkenius* for *Bellarmin* replys, *He labours in vain to prove theſe places are meant of ſpiritual power for this they freely grant him. But*, ſay they, *this power which formally is ſpiritual, is virtually temporal, or has the vertue to extend it ſelf to temporals, in as much as is requiſite to ſpiritual good. And therefore* Bellarmins *Argument is good, becauſe he intended only to prove by it that the Popes power was formally ſpiritual, which is true, and acknowledged by* Withrington. *But* Withringtons *naught, becauſe he does not prove that the Power is not virtually Temporal, and cannot extend to depoſition,* &c. If I had a mind to anſwer for *Withrington*, I ſhould not think my ſelf ſilenc'd by this reply. For when he ſays the Arguments are unlike, the one good the other bad, I cannot perceive by what reaſon one ſhould believe him. *Bellarmins* Argument is good, ſays he, becauſe his Concluſion (that the Popes Power is ſpiritual) is true: as if the Argument were a jot the better becauſe the Concluſion is true. The Argument is naught if the Concluſion follow not from the premiſſes, though it be never ſo great a truth otherwiſe. But what was the Argument? No *direct* Power in Scripture, therefore no *direct* Power. This I take is *Bellarmins* Argument; and by the favour of *Schulkenius*, no depoſing Power in Scripture, therefore no depoſing Power is ſo like it, that they muſt be both good or neither. That the Concluſion

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of the one is true, and the other false, is voluntarily said, and nothing to purpose: for the question is whether they have not the same dependance on their premisses. If *Bellarmin* conclude well against the Canonists, because they cannot shew their *direct* Power in Scripture, I see not why *Withrington* concludes not as well against *Bellarmin*, unless he can shew his deposing Power in Scripture; which as far as I see *Schulkenius* does not go about to do. But I have nothing to do with *Withrington*, he has answer'd for himself, though by ill luck I have not the Book now by me. I am only to observe how the case stands betwixt the two parties; which in short is thus: Is the deposing Power in Scripture, says *Withrington?* 'Tis virtually, says *Schulkenius*. I fear this is no very direct answer, and suppose *Withrington* should ask again: Is this vertue apparent in Scripture? To which *Schulk* gives me no ground to judge what he would reply. And so I must leave them as I find them, and pass to the Second Argument. *Coercitive Civil, and coercitive spiritual Power being different and independent Powers, must have distinct Courts and distinct penalties. Wherefore as the Civil Power cannot inflict a spiritual punishment, so neither can the spiritual Power inflict a civil punishment.* And this he strengthens by two Considerations. 1. *That the distinction of the two Courts, since in the manner of proceeding, the persons and causes brought before them, and all other formalities they may agree, must be taken from the difference of the penalties, or nothing.* 2. *Because no Commonwealth, looking only into nature, can deprive a subject of other goods then such as are proper to that Commonwealth; the spiritual can only take away spiritual goods, as the temporal only temporal.* They answer. *The two Powers are distinct, but not wholly independent, when they club into one mystical Body,* viz. the Church, *in which case the temporal is subject to the spiritual, and therefore though the temporal cannot meddle with the spiritual, the spiritual may with the temporal.* And for his additional Considerations, they slight the first as being nothing but the conclusion of his argument repeated: yet say however *that Temporal punishments are not so proper to Temporal power, but they may be inflicted by the spiritual.* And to the second, *that in Commonwealths subordinate, the superior may deprive the subject not only of the priviledges proper to it self, but those also which belong to the inferior Commonwealth.* This answer relishes much better with me then the former, for it plainly denies at least half of, what is assumed, namely that the powers are independent, which is a direct and

allowable anſwer for ſo much. But for the other half, they deal not ſo cleverly. They allow the powers diſtinct even in their penalties, and yet maintain that one may award the penalties of the other, which looks as if they were not diſtinct in their penalties. Again, they ſay they are diſtinct, but aſſign not in what they are diſtinct. They deny not what *Withrington* aſſumes that they may uſe the ſame proceedings, take cognizance of the ſame matters, convene the ſame perſons; And if they may inflict the ſame penalties too, by what ſhall they be diſtinguiſht? So that I think they had no ſuch great reaſon to ſlight his firſt conſideration. For certainly diſtinct powers muſt be diſtinct in ſomething. But you ſee where it reſts. *Withrington*, ſince they deny it, is oblig'd to prove the Independence of the two Powers, which whether he have done or no, I cannot tell. Shall I tell you my thoughts freely. I ſuſpect the old School-Proverb, *An Aſs may deny more more than Ariſtotle can prove*, may have ſome place here, and that the Anſwerer has ſtill the better end of the ſtaff. When it was *Bellarmins* turn to prove the dependance and ſubordination of the two Powers, and *Withringtons* to anſwer, you may perceive by my laſt where you have the Argument, He could deal well enough with *Bellarmin*. Now they have changed ſides, and *Withrington* is on the proving hand, how it will happen I know not.

The third Argument is from the multitude of inconveniences which follow from the other opinion. As, *that the Pope may as well take the life, as Kingdom of any Prince*, and driving it a little higher, *authorize any private man to turn Aſſaſſin, and kill the King by treachery, when he cannot be conveniently depos'd.* To this they ſay they can anſwer eaſily enough: but yet as eaſy as it is they do it not. All they reply is, *let this paſs as nothing to purpoſe: meer bugbears to render the Papacy odious, when of ſo many Princes who have been depos'd, ſo many who have periſht by violent deaths, what by the treachery of their ſubjects, what by the force of their Enemys, not one has been kill'd by any Pope or his command. Even Antipopes themſelves their greateſt enemyes, have found not only ſafety, but gentle and favourable uſage from them when they have faln into their hands.* This they amplyfy, and dreſs as handſomly as they can; but methinks after all tis but a ſorry diſh. For ſure tis no God-a-mercy to the opinion, that *Popes* have been better men, then It would have made them. On the contrary, ſince they were therefore good men becauſe they did not do what the opinion allows,

lows, what muſt the opinion be, which if they had follow'd they had not been good men. That they did not do ill, they owe to their own vertue, but that they might have done ill, makes the opinion naught. At leaſt I conceive ſo, and had I been in their place, would rather have given no anſwer then ſuch a one

For another inconvenience he urges, that *Princes may be depoſed and murthered for any crime which in the judgement of the Pope deſerves it; if he ſell a Biſhoprick, plunder a Church, fall into any ſort of wickedneſs, nay, if he live not according as his ſtate and condition requires.* To this laſt they except, as a wreſting of *Bellarmins* words beyond his intention; but for the reſt, reply again, that *'tis another odious amplification, and that it may be underſtood for what cauſes Princes may be depos'd by the ſentences againſt* Hen. 4. *and* Fred. 2. *In general, that the cauſes muſt be very weighty, and ſuch that the puniſhment be to edification not deſtruction.* I muſt acknowledge my dulneſs, and that I comprehend not the force of this anſwer. To my apprehenſion by the ſentences againſt theſe two Emperors can be known no more, then the reaſon why theſe two Emperors were depoſed; from whence it may be gathered that for the ſame faults a Prince may become liable to the ſame puniſhment; but whether there be any other depoſing faults, and which they be, cannot, I think, be underſtood by them. Then again theſe *weighty*, and *to edification-cauſes* may, for any thing they ſay to the contrary, be any which the Pope judges ſuch; Now this is that which *VVithrington* objects; and I had thought that to ſay the ſame with my Adverſary, had not been to anſwer him.

The third Inconvenience is, that, *not only the Pope, but every Biſhop may depoſe by this doctrine* (and with a little more ſtretching, perhaps every Curate too) *where the Prince belongs to their Dioceſs or Pariſh.* And this he juſtifies by an argument of *Bellarmins* againſt the Canoniſts, which he puts thus, *If the Pope be the ſupreme Lord of the whole Chriſtian world, every Biſhop is Lord of the Towns ſubject to his Biſhoprick; for what the Pope is in the univerſal Church, every Biſhop is in his own Dioceſs.* They reply, that *by this argument it may perhaps be concluded, that a Biſhop may excommunicate a Prince as well as the Pope, but not depoſe him; becauſe though he be in his Dioceſs what the Pope is in the Church, as much as amounts to being truly a Paſtor, and truly a ſpiritual Prince, not a Vicar or temporary Delegate; yet the Pope has more power over the whole, then a Biſhop over his particular. For which reaſon depoſition was reſerv'd to*

the Pope in the Council of Lateran. *Wherefore* Bellarmins *Argument is good, and* Withringtons *naught.* He who undertakes the defence of another muſt ſtand to it, that his man is ſtill in the right: but otherwiſe I ſee not why one argument ſhould be thought good and the other bad. If the Pope be a temporal Prince, the Biſhop is a temporal Prince, ſays *Bellarmin*, becauſe he is in his part what the Pope is in the whole: this is good, ſays *Schulkenius*. If the Pope be a virtually temporal Prince, the Biſhop is a virtually temporal Prince, ſays *Withrington*, and for the ſame reaſon, how comes this to be bad? becauſe ſays *Schulkenius*, the Pope has more power over the whole then the Biſhop over his particular. This belongs to Biſhop-craft, which I underſtand not; but if it be true, firſt *Bellarmins* argument is as bad as *Withringtons*; for it may be reply'd to it, that it does not follow the Biſhop is a temporal Prince though the Pope be, becauſe though the Biſhop be no Vicar, yet he has not the power which the Pope has. And then again, though the Pope be a greater virtually temporal Prince then the Biſhop, yet the Biſhop is a virtually temporal Prince too, and may proceed beyond excommunication, and ſpiritual juriſdiction, and ſet his hand to temporals. For if ſpiritual power be virtually temporal, and the Biſhop have it, and this in his own right as well as the Pope, not by way of delegation, I hope he may uſe what he has, and diſpoſe of temporal things in order to ſpiritual good. And where ſhall this ſtop? To mention as he does reſervations is to grant that it belongs to the nature of the power, though the extent of it were afterwards confin'd by conſent. Beſides reſervations are temporary and changeable things, and what is reſerv'd to day may not be ſo to morrow. However if the greater virtually temporal Prince may depoſe Kings, ſure the leſſer may depoſe private men: for this temporal vertue muſt be able to do ſomething in Temporals. And thus much is inconvenience enough in conſcience, though I ſee not well how he avoids the other. Were I to anſwer *Sculkenius*, I ſhould except againſt his underſtanding the *Samenes* which *Bellarmin* puts in *Pope* and Biſhop, of being both ſpiritual Princes not Vicars, which I verily think is to make *Bellarmin* ſay what he never dreamt of, or if he did, was quite from his purpoſe: But that is not my buſineſs. I am only to obſerve how matters ſtand, which are as you ſee.

In the laſt place *Withrington* urges that *this ſupream power over tempo-*

temporals delivered in ſuch general and unlimited terms, not determining how great, or what kind of ſpiritual good that muſt be, in order to which Depoſition is lawful, ſeems a juſt occaſion of perpetual ſuſpicion and jealouſy in Princes, and apt to diſturb the publick quiet, &c. They anſwer, *Chriſt may as juſtly be reprehended for delivering the ſpiritual power in general terms; as Commonwealths for ſubmitting in general to obedience of Princes whom they create.* Whereof I take neither to be true: for Commonwealths have things call'd Laws and Cuſtoms by which doubts riſing from general expreſſions are explained. And for the general expreſſion in the Goſpel, *whatever you ſhall bind*, &c. I hope he will not perſwade us, but as general as it ſounds to us, it was very particularly underſtood by the Apoſtles. And as they underſtood it, ſo they practis'd and ſo they taught, and among other things, ſubjection to Princes, notwithſtanding the amplitude of that Commiſſion. But if both were true, ſtill the inconvenience remains, for ought I can ſee; ſince whatever be the reaſon of the general terms us'd in the Goſpel and elſewhere, it abates nothing of the jealouſy and ſuſpicion riſing from the unlimited expreſſions of this doctrine. Upon the whole, they ſeem plainly to grant all the inconveniences objected by *VVithrington*; which is to confeſs that, as far as this Topick is effectual, They are confuted. They ſlight the place as nothing to purpoſe, notwithſtanding, ſince 'tis the Goſpel rule to judge of the Tree by the fruit and ſince Logick allows the Topick, I think they were oblig'd to ſhew either that the inconveniences were not inconveniences, or elſe that they did not follow, and in fine have anſwered better if they could.

The fourth Argument is from the *practice of the Church, begun with the Church it ſelf, and continued for many ages: no mention in Scripture or ancient Fathers of a power either in Pope or People to deprive, or kill even perſecuting Princes, but all is unanimous and conſtant exhortation to patience and obedience. Now if there be any warrant in the Goſpel for Chriſtians, when they come to be ſtrong enough, to caſt off ſuch Princes as are enemies to the Church, we muſt needs have heard of it*, &c. *VVithrington* dilates, but this is the ſubſtance. They anſwer two things: Firſt, That *the practice of the Church varies according to different times. That for the firſt 300 years ſhe practis'd patience becauſe ſhe could do no other, there being no Prince diſpos'd to protect her; afterwards it became the practice by means of Catholick Princes to reſiſt Infidel or Heretick, or any way injurious to her, whether*

whether Princes or People. And for this they largely inſtance in the ſeveral expeditions made for the recovery of the Holy Land, all commanded, ſay they, by ſeveral Popes, and their commands obey'd by Chriſtian Princes. I begin to ſuſpect I do not underſtand what we are talking of: if I do, certainly this is nothing to it. I thought the queſtion had been whether ſubjects may lawfully deſert their own Prince, and refuſe to perform the obedience due to them by Law and Oath, upon the Popes command to the contrary, and *Sculkenius* talks of one Prince making war with another. No man doubts, or if any do, our buſineſs has nothing to do with his doubt, but that Catholick Princes may lawfully make war, and the Pope lawfully perſwade them to it to protect innocence, and hinder oppreſſion whether of Eccleſiaſtical or other right. But this is a caſe betwixt Prince and Prince; ours, if I underſtand it, is betwixt Prince and Subject. For my life I cannot underſtand what relation the holy war has to this matter: nor can I imagin what ſhare the Pope had in it, more then a man of zeal and credit to perſwade them, as any other might have done, to a good work. I do not believe any Prince who went thither thought himſelf oblig'd by the Popes commands, or that he commanded any to go, except in the caſe of Vow, or the like engagement of his own. 'Twas zeal, not obedience which carried Princes thither. In ſhort, if *Schulkenius* mean this practiſe, which he ſays was introduc'd of reſiſting force by force of Princes interpoſing for the relief of innocence as they ſaw occaſion, he ſpeaks of another matter: If he mean that when ſubjects get force enough they may uſe it againſt their own Soveraign, upon warrant of the Popes authority, he teaches us a piece of Chriſtiatity, which I would adviſe ſhould by all means be kept carefully conceal'd from thoſe Infidels whom in the *Indies* and elſewhere zealous men ſeek to convert. If ever they get any inkling, farewel all hopes of the progreſs of Chriſtianity. 'Tis in truth a poſition extreamly falſe, and extreamly ſhameful. Their ſecond Anſwer is, that *Withrington* is out, when he affirms there is no mention in Scripture or the ancient Fathers of depoſing or killing Perſecutors. *For there is mention in both of Saul depos'd by Samuel, and David plac'd in his room: Of Agag kill'd: Of ten Tribes taken by Ahias from the houſe of David and given to Jereboam: Of Kings ſet up and pul'd down by Elias both in Iſrael and Syria: Of Jehu made King by a Prophet, and Joram both depos'd and kill'd: Of*

thalia

thalia, and Ozias, one kill'd, the other depos'd for Leprosy: Of Hieremy plac'd over Nations and Kingdoms, to pluck up, &c. *Of the Macabees fighting successfully against Antiochus. And it cannot be doubted but the High Priest among Christians has as great, or greater power then the High Priest among the Jews:* where they repeat again the two places. *Mat.* 16. and *Joh.* 21. and that deposing power is necessary to the integrity of the commission given by them: and conclude with *Lucifer Calaritanus*, who says nothing to the purpose. Some think *Bellarmin* wrote this book, and borrowed the name of *Schulkenius* to disguise his own. *Tenderdown* Steeple had as much to do with *Sandwich* Haven, as this with the Deposing Power. It were easy to shew as much of every one of these examples, if I would take the pains to run them over particularly: but since *Bellarmin* himself slights them, I may be permitted to do so too, and save that labor. I will only observe that the High Priest among the Jews interven'd in few of these examples, and to conclude a power in the Christian High Priest by a parity with the Jewish High Priest from instances where there was no exercise of his Power, is a shortness of which *Bellarmin* was too sharp-sighted to be guilty. That which *Lucifer Calaritanus* says, is that *Constantius* was a wicked man, and deserved death: which is *Tenderdown* Steeple again. A Prince no doubt may be a wicked man, there have been more in the world besides *Constantius*, and more have taken notice of their wickedness besides *Lucifer Calaritanus*. But what then? Neither does he mention, nor do I know any tribunal, which can call them to account for their wickedness but that of the last day, from whose impartial Justice Princes shall be no more exempt then other men. And to that we must leave them.

The last is rather a Transition then an Argument at least the force of it depends on what follows. *Withrington* makes it in this manner. *To subject Princes to another power without sufficient reason, is plain injury to Princes, and plain treason. But Bellarmins reasons, which are the best, are insufficient,* &c. And so goes on to examin and disprove them, as I have already inform'd you. They reply by retorting the same Argument. *As tis wicked to subject the Power of Princes, so tis both wicked and sacrilegious to diminish the Power given by Christ without sufficient reason; but the reasons of Withrington and Barclay are insufficient,* &c. *They farther deny either that he has, or can answer Bellarmin's reasons, or that he has done his business*

though

though he could, becauſe another may have better. But unles they would inform us where thoſe better reaſons are to be found, there can be no more done, then to deal with thoſe, which He who is moſt in vogue thought the beſt. For the reſt, theſe are floriſhes on both ſides; The matter reſts upon this iſſue, which of the two has the beſt reaſons, and he that has will carry it. Tis time for me to leave it with you to ſtand for the Plaintiff or Defendant as you ſee cauſe, and eaſe my ſelf of this ungrateful labour.

You ſee what is ſaid on both ſides To tell you what the world thinks of their ſayings, is not ſo eaſy. The world is a politick world, they let the hot men write and wrangle, and for themſelves hear all, and ſee all, and ſay nothing. The truth is, while one ſide talks of Treaſon, and the other of Sacrilege, tis good to be wary. Tis not for private men to make an enemy either of *Pope* or *Prince*, and as the caſe ſtands you cannot ſay I, or No, without diſpleaſing one. I muſt confeſs I am very ſorry you would not let me play the Policitian for company. Your importunity has drawn me into the liſt of thoſe fools, who diſquiet themſelves to pleaſe other folks, and take a great deal of pains to be talk't on, twenty to one, very ſcurvily. The quarrel is betwixt ſupream Powers, and they beſt know what to do in their own concerns. I fear tis little better then ſawcines for men of our form to interpoſe in things ſo far above us, and perhaps madneſs, to thruſt in bewixt two ſtones, and be cruſht in pieces. I ſee this, yet cannot avoid whether the charms of your Friendſhip or violence of your importunity. Tis true I have endeavoured to touch this tender matter as tenderly as I could. What I profeſt at firſt, I repeat again, I do not dogmatize but relate, and am ſure you have no reaſon to be diſpleaſed, that I would diſpleaſe as few as I could. This is the reaſon, ſince you will needs have it, why I beat about the buſh, and do not ſhoot my fools-bolt directly at the mark, I do not take the ſatisfaction of your curioſity to import me ſo much as living quietly. Tis for Princes to reſolve on the *Can not*, or *Shall not* or what elſe they think fit. Private men till they be commanded to declare them do beſt to keep their thoughts to themſelves. This I can aſſure you, that, though for theſe reaſons I do not deſire every body ſhould know them, I have none in this matter which do not become a good Chriſtian and a good ſubject, and

Your faithful friend, &c.